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 Climate change is a topic that permeates today’s scientific, political, 
and social discourse.  It is a term that is both widely known and hotly 
debated across the country and across the globe.  While an ever-increasing 
majority of the scientific and political realms has come to the conclusion 
that meaningful climate change regulation is necessary to prevent negative 
repercussions across the globe, there is little consensus on what that 
regulation should look like or how to bring it about. 
 The nature of greenhouse gases, or GHGs, makes international 
cooperation a must if the world hopes to prevent and avoid the experts’ 
predictions of widespread negative environmental effects.  Because each 
state only incurs a fraction of the total cost of its own emissions, as GHGs 
act on a global rather than regional scale, the emission of GHGs has 
created a tragedy of the commons:  each state has an incentive to overuse, 
even though the optimal solution is for each and every state to limit its 
emissions.  States acting in their own best interests will therefore continue 
to emit GHGs unless they can be sure that all other states will agree to and 
adhere to meaningful regulation. 
 In the abstract, this solution seems simple enough:  in order to prevent 
the negative effects associated with climate change, all states must agree to 
limit emissions and each state must be assured that all other states will not 
defect.  However, on the international level where each state is sovereign, 
there is no enforcement mechanism to guarantee that states refrain from 
defecting.  Therefore, in order for GHG regulation to succeed, there must 
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be some mechanism by which the incentive to defect is replaced by an 
incentive to cooperate. 
 In order to determine what type of mechanism is most appropriate for 
the regulation of climate change, one must examine the international 
system to understand how and why states act as they do.  While it is 
generally assumed that states act in their own best interests, many theorists 
believe that these interests are shaped and informed by social and cultural 
norms.  According to this understanding, it is possible to influence state 
behavior by changing the social and cultural norms of international 
society.  As applied to the issue at hand, this means that the incentive to 
defect might be transformed into an incentive to cooperate if the social and 
cultural rules require states to cooperate when it comes to GHG emissions. 
 Scientists predict that time is running out for meaningful regulation, 
and that absent some drastic change GHG emissions will create a negative 
feedback loop in which the negative effects of climate change will become 
unstoppable.  If the world hopes to change this outcome, one or more states 
must adopt meaningful climate change regulation and hope that in so doing 
they will be able to affect the social and cultural norms of international 
society, thereby incentivizing states to cooperate rather than defect on 
GHG emission regulation. 
 This Note suggests that the optimal state to take this leadership role is 
the United States.  Still, even if the U.S. were to take this role beginning 
tomorrow, its chances of success remain dismal.  Essentially, it must race 
against the clock to change the norms of international society, while 
incurring the costs of GHG regulation, and hope that such actions will lead 
to international cooperation.  While the U.S. may determine that this slight 
chance of success is not worth the cost, absent the strong leadership of one 
or more countries actively advocating for all states to adopt GHG 
emissions regulation, meaningful climate change regulation is a hopeless 
endeavor. 
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 The majority of today‘s scientific and political worlds generally agree 
that meaningful climate change regulation is not only beneficial, but 
necessary if the world hopes to avoid short and long term negative 
repercussions affecting the environment and in turn the way we live.
1
  Due 
to the nature of greenhouse gases (GHGs) and the general causes of climate 
change, any regulation that is soon enough and drastic enough requires 
universal cooperation of the major emitters and widespread cooperation 
around the globe.
2
  In other words, it requires that all states agree.   
 The agreement of the entire world is particularly difficult due to 
national sovereignty—the principle that each state gets to make its own 
decisions and cannot be bound internationally absent its own consent.
3
  
Assuming that states act rationally in making such decisions, one might 
conclude that a state will choose to cooperate with other nations only when 
it is within that state‘s own best interests, or at least perceived best 
interests.
4
   
 The emission of GHGs creates a tragedy of the commons problem.
5
  
Because each state only has to absorb a fraction of the total cost of its own 
emissions, due to the fact that emissions act on a global rather than regional 
scale, there is an incentive for states to emit greater rather than lesser 
amounts of GHGs.
6
  In order to avoid this problem and reach the optimal 
international emissions levels, all states must agree.
7
  However, since there 
are no enforcing mechanisms on the international level due to national 
sovereignty,
8
 voluntary state consent is necessary.  In the global commons, 
each nation has an incentive to defect, thereby capitalizing on the reduced 
emissions of other countries while avoiding the costs of capping their own 
emissions.
9
  Absent some kind of outside influence, these incentives to 
defect will ensure that meaningful cooperation is never realized.  
 In order to identify ways in which to create information and 
motivations that will enable states to avoid the tragedy of the commons, one 
must first adopt a general lens through which to view state action.
10
  For 
                                                        
 1.  Infra Part II.   
 2.  Infra Part II.   
 3.  Infra Part III.   
 4.  Infra Part IV.  
 5.  Infra Part V.   
 6.  Infra Part V. 
 7.  Infra Part V. 
 8.  Infra Part III.   
 9.  Infra Part V.  
 10.  Infra Part VI.   
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reasons justified within this work, the international relations lens of 
constructivism is most conducive to our current purposes.
11
  This theory 
says that while states do act in their own best interest, these preferences and 
choices are shaped and informed by social and cultural norms.
12
  Several 
examples of international cooperation do exist, showing that where other 
motivations come into play, meaningful regulation is possible.
13
   
 Currently, states are not agreeing to high enough and specific enough 
emissions standards.
14
  Based on the following analysis, if the world hopes 
to address this problem before it is too late, it must find a way to create 
social and cultural motivations to climate change that go beyond those 
already in place.  There are three primary ways that this might happen.  The 
first is naturally:  however this slow paced option is less than optimal, 
particularly when scientific estimates predict that regulation is time 
sensitive.  The second way nations will change their preferences is in 
reaction to some crisis—in this case the drastic changes in climate predicted 
as a result of continuing GHG emissions.  The problem of course with this 
option is that once GHG emissions reach a certain level, they will create a 
"feedback loop "at which point any actions taken by states will have limited 
effectiveness because these past emissions will have committed the globe to 
some degree of warming.
15
   
 The third and final option is that one or more states adopt meaningful 
climate change regulation as an interest integral to their identity and hence 
lead the way in shaping the interactions of states at the international level, 
thereby encouraging regulation.  The obvious candidate for this job is the 
United States, but the U.S. must decide whether it wants to absorb the costs 
and risks associated with being such a leader.
16
 
 What this analysis generally means is that climate change regulation at 
the international level is highly unlikely, even in the best scenario.  While 
the use of a constructivist lens provides some hope, it is improbable that 
regulation will occur and absent strong leadership from a country like the 
United States, it becomes practically impossible.
17




                                                        
 11.  Infra Part VIII.   
 12.  Infra Part VIII.  
 13.  Infra Part IX.  
 14.  See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: 
SYNTHESIS REPORT 66–67 (2007) [hereinafter IPCC] (estimating the emissions trajectories 
needed for stabilization).    
 15.  See infra note 22 and accompanying text (supporting the possibility of a feedback 
loop). 
 16.  Infra Part X.   
 17.  Infra Part X. 
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II. Background on Global Climate Change 
 
 Global climate change regulation is an increasingly important topic of 
international law.
18
  Today, there is general agreement around the world 
that the earth‘s climate is changing, that these changes are a result of human 
activity and that they are occurring at faster rates and with greater impacts 
than first estimated; and as a result most scientists agree that immediate 
action is required to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
19
  However, 
agreement on what exactly that action should look like has yet to be 
meaningfully realized.       
 Scientists have noted a variety of effects resulting from climate change 
that are currently identifiable.  Generally, these findings show that the 
earth‘s climate is warmer that it has ever been in the past 500 years, and 
many scientists argue that it is probable that these temperatures surpass 
averages from as far back as the last 1,000 years.
20
  Over the past one 
hundred years, average temperatures have generally increased and the 
climate as a whole has become increasingly extreme.
21
   
 Scientists also predict that the effects of climate change, particularly 
absent meaningful regulation of emissions, will continue to affect the 
earth‘s climate in a variety of ways.
22
  One of the most striking effects cited 
by scientists is the potential for steadily increasing temperatures.
23
  At some 
                                                        
 18.  See CHRIS WOLD, DAVID HUNTER & MELISSA POWERS, CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE 
LAW 2 (LexisNexis 2009) ("Climate change refers to the response of the planet‘s climate 
system to altered concentrations of . . . ‗greenhouse gases‘ in the atmosphere.  If all else is 
held constant . . . increased concentrations of greenhouse gases lead to ‗global warming‘—
an increase in global average temperatures—and associated changes in the earth‘s climate 
patterns.").     
 19. See, e.g., WOLD ET AL., supra note 18, at 2 (arguing that these findings are no 
longer refuted except by a handful of "climate skeptics," and that the debate now centers not 
on whether humans are causing the observed changes in climate but what the effects of this 
impact will be and the most effective means of addressing it).   
 20. See IPCC, supra note 14, at 30 (laying out these observations); see also CLIFFORD 
RECHTSCHAFFEN, EILEEN GAUNA & CATHERINE A. O‘NEILL, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE:  LAW 
POLICY & REGULATION 390 (Carolina Academic Press 2009) (summarizing the IPCC report).   
 21.  See IPCC, supra note 14, at 31, Fig. 1 (depicting the upward trend in temperature); 
see also RECHTSCHAFFEN ET AL., supra note 20, at 390–91 (finding average temperatures 
increased 1.33 degrees Fahrenheit over the past 100 years, cold days and nights have 
decreased, level four or five hurricanes have increased by 75% since 1970, and eleven of the 
twelve years between 1995 and 2006 were among the 12 warmest in the past 150 years).   
 22.  See generally IPCC, supra note 14, at 48–54 (laying out the impacts of climate 
change in the near and long term); see also PHILIP WEINBERG & KEVIN A. REILLY, 
UNDERSTANDING ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 426 (LexisNexis 2008) (citing effects including a 
rise in sea level, coastal flooding, a loss of forests, increased and more volatile storms, 
increased desertification, and melting polar ice cap).   
 23.  See, e.g., IPCC, supra note 14, at 46 (charting the predicted increases in 
temperature); see also WEINBERG & REILLY supra note 22, at 426–27 (predicting that the 
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point, absent meaningful reductions in GHG emissions, scientists anticipate 
an unstoppable "feedback loop" at which point our actions will be unable to 
have a great impact on the rate of global warming because our past 
emissions have already committed us to some degree of warming.
24
  In fact, 
some scientists have argued that if the earth continues to emit at its current 
rate, at least some of the effects on global climate will be irreversible by 
2030.
25
  This increase in temperature is problematic, despite the fact that it 
seems to be only a few degrees, because even slight changes can cause 
many of the issues previously discussed.
26
 
 In order to address these problems, international cooperation and 
regulation is a must.  This conclusion stems from the properties of 
greenhouse gases (GHGs), the increased concentrations of which have 
largely led to the increase in temperatures associated with climate change.
27
  
First, the effects of GHGs are global, meaning that carbon dioxide emitted 
in one location will have the same effect on global climate change around 
the world as would an emission from any other location.
28
  Secondly, most 
GHGs remain in the atmosphere for decades or even longer and therefore 
emissions have a cumulative effect.
29
  This effectively means that one 
                                                                                                                                
earth‘s average temperature will increase as much as three to eight degrees Fahrenheit in the 
next century, causing polar ice caps to melt, sea levels to rise, wetlands to be destroyed, and 
low-lying countries to be flooded); see also RECHTSCHAFFEN ET AL., supra note 20, at 391 
(discussing the IPCC predictions that if we fail to reduce GHG emissions, temperatures will 
likely rise by 3.2 to 7.2 degrees Fahrenheit between 2000 and 2100). 
 24.  IPCC, supra note 14, at 46–47; see also RECHTSCHAFFEN ET AL., supra note 20, at 
391 (Estimating that an increase in 3.6 degrees Fahrenheit is the threshold beyond which the 
impacts of climate change are likely to be particularly grave due to the risks involved with 
such an unstoppable feedback loop). 
 25. IPCC, supra note 14, at 46–47; see also RECHTSCHAFFEN ET AL., supra note 20, at 
391 (Estimating that an increase in 3.6 degrees Fahrenheit is the threshold beyond which the 
impacts of climate change are likely to be particularly grave due to the risks involved with 
such an unstoppable feedback loop).  
 26.  See generally IPCC, supra note 14 (predicting the potential effects of even slight 
changes); see also WEINBERG & REILLY, supra note 22, at 427 (listing desertification, 
increased storm intensity, and decreased crop yields as some of the most drastic effects 
likely to result from even a few degrees increase in global temperature).   
 27.  See IPCC, supra note 14, at 36–37 (detailing the ways in which GHGs cause the 
observed changes in climate); see also GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW 5 (Michael 
G. Gerrard, ed., American Bar Association 2007) ("[T]he accumulation of certain gases in 
the atmosphere traps some of the infrared radiation and prevents it from escaping.  Instead, 
the greenhouse gases absorb and re-radiate the heat.  This warms the surface of the earth.  
The more greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, the more warming of the earth.").   
 28.  See GERRARD, supra note 27, at 5 (finding that once emitted into the atmosphere, 
GHGs travel the globe and have the same effect irrespective of where they originated).   
 29.  See IPCC, supra note 14, at 46–47 ("Anthropogenic warming and sea level rise 
would continue for centuries due to the time scales associated with climate processes and 
feedbacks, even if GHG concentrations were to be stabilized."); see also GERRARD, supra 
note 27, at 6 (stating that unlike many other air pollutants, GHGs do not have primarily local 
or regional effects that are gone within weeks or months).   
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nation alone, especially one of the larger emitters like the United States or 
China,
30
 could emit enough GHGs to ensure massive global climate change 
and all the negative implications that result, even if all other countries were 
working together to mitigate these results.
31
  In other words, international 
agreement and cooperation is essential to a meaningful solution.  Thus far, 
most attempts at international cooperation regarding climate change 





III. National Sovereignty:  The Building Block of International Law 
 
 Consideration of national sovereignty and the ability of states to 
choose their own actions is central to an understanding of the tragedy of the 
commons.  Absent national sovereignty, climate change could be 
effectively addressed by some kind of top-down authority.  Since such a 
supranational regulatory authority might be successful in addressing climate 
change, it is necessary to have a general understanding of why such a 
system is not utilized.  
 A core component of international law provides that states are the 
principal actors in world politics.
33
  In other words, states have national 
                                                        
 30.  See KEVIN A. BAUMERT, TIMOTHY HERZOG & JONATHAN PERSHING, NAVIGATING 
THE NUMBERS:  GREENHOUSE GAS DATA AND INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY Fig. 3.1 
(World Resources Institute 2005) (ranking the world‘s largest emitters, placing the United 
States in first and China in second with 20.6% and 14.7% of the world‘s emissions 
respectively).   
 31.  See WOLD ET AL., supra note 18, at 127–28 (describing climate change as an 
"inherently global issue" in which international cooperation is required).   
 32.  See, e.g., United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 31 INT‘L 
LEGAL MATS 49 (1992), art. 2(a) (being the first such convention,  signed by over one 
hundred and ninety countries, including the United States); see also WEINBERG & REILLY, 
supra note 22, at 427 (requiring that each signatory adopt national policies and take 
corresponding measures on the mitigation of climate change by limiting the emissions of 
greenhouse gases); RECHTSCHAFFEN ET AL., supra note 20, at 400 (reflecting the view of the 
signatories that developed countries have greater historical responsibility and a greater 
capacity to take action).  In 1997, a second attempt known as the Kyoto Protocol where in 
the aggregate, developed countries aimed at a 5 percent reduction from 1990 levels by the 
first reporting period of 2008-2012.  See WOLD ET AL., supra note 18, at 205 (discussing the 
core of the Kyoto Protocol which focused on targets and timetables for GHG emissions and 
the adoption of emissions trading, but also pointing to key implementation challenges).  The 
last of these conventions, known as the Copenhagen accord, exemplifies the most recent 
international efforts to address global climate change. See FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE: COPENHAGEN ACCORD (2009) available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/l07.pdf. (last visited Oct. 31, 2010). 
 33.  See SHIRLEY V. SCOTT, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN WORLD POLITICS:  AN 
INTRODUCTION 21–22 (Lynne Rienner Publishers 2004) (describing how a state must be 
sovereign in order to belong to the international system of states).  
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sovereignty, and are not subject to international law absent their own 
consent to be bound.
34
   
 
The international legal order regulates the activities of an 
international community comprising states, international 
organisations, and non-governmental actors.  States have the 
primary role in the international legal order, both international 
law-makers and holders of international rights and obligations . . . 
The doctrine of sovereignty and equality of states has three 
principal corollaries, namely that states have ‗(1) a jurisdiction, 
prima facie exclusive, over a territory and a permanent population 
there; (2) a duty of non-intervention in the area of exclusive 
jurisdiction of other states; and (3) the dependence of obligations 





In this way, statehood, or national sovereignty, is determined by 
constitutional independence rather than international law.
36
   
 There are certain sweeping powers and rights generally recognized as 
a result of national sovereignty including the following:  the power to exert 
authority over individuals living within the state‘s territory, the power to 
use and dispose of territory under the state‘s jurisdiction and to perform 
those activities deemed "necessary or beneficial" to the state‘s people, the 
right that no other State intrude in the State‘s territory, the right to 
immunity from jurisdiction of foreign courts for official acts of the State 
and acts of the State‘s official representatives, and the right to respect for 
life and property of the States nationals and State officials abroad.
37
   
 For the purpose of determining the failure of international 
environmental law with regards to GHG emissions, national sovereignty 
                                                        
 34.  See WEINBERG & REILLY, supra note 22, at 424 (stating that absent enforceable 
treaty provisions binding their action, nation states are sovereign within their own 
jurisdiction, meaning that such states can only be bound if they themselves consent to such 
limitations).   
 35.  See PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: 
VOLUME 1 FRAMEWORKS, STANDARDS, AND IMPLEMENTATION 15 (Manchester University 
Press 1995) (detailing the international legal order according to the notion of sovereignty, 
which gives states the sole right to develop policies and laws regarding the natural resources 
within their territorial limits).   
 36.  See SCOTT, supra note 33, at 22 ("‗Sovereignty in the relations between States 
signifies independence.  Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the right to 
exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other State, the functions of a State.‘" (citing a 
statement by Max Huber in the Island of Palmas case)).   
 37.  See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 49–52 (Oxford University Press 
2005) (2001) (listing the six basic rights and powers afforded to states with national 
sovereignty).   
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can be understood as giving states the ability to enter into relationships with 
other states, which in effect also means that a state‘s choice in structuring 
these relationships is not subject to scrutiny by international law.
38
  
Historically, a claim to state sovereignty has been used by nations to exploit 
resources outside a state‘s borders on a "first come, first served" basis.
39
  
This state-centered understanding is problematic because compliance is 
voluntary and an incentive to comply is thwarted by any perception that 
noncompliance better serves a nation‘s interests.
40
 
 Ultimately, an international system centered on national sovereignty 
means that states cannot be required to act, and relevant to the current 
analysis, cannot be required by an overarching authority to regulate the 
emissions of GHGs produced and emitted within their borders.  Instead, for 
meaningful climate change regulation to take effect, states must voluntarily 
choose to adopt policies limiting emissions.  For this reason, when and why 
states enter into agreements becomes important to the determination of 
whether international cooperation is possible and/or probable for climate 
change regulation.   
 
IV. Implications of Sovereignty on State Decision Making 
 
 In spite of national sovereignty and the ability to make their own 
independent decisions, states do in fact enter into agreements with other 
states on a regular basis with the intent of binding the action of each.
41
  
When they do so, they have nearly complete control over the content and 
form of the deals they are striking.
42
  This is particularly true for the most 
                                                        
 38.  See SCOTT, supra note 33, at 22 (citing James H. Wolfe‘s assertion that while 
international law can regulate between states it does not rise above them and therefore does 
not truly bind them).   
 39.  See BRUCE YANDLE, COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: 
CREATING WEALTH IN HUMMINGBIRD ECONOMIES 2 (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 
1997) (discussing this phenomenon in terms of the "Commons Problem" and stating:  "In the 
simplest possible terms, common access or the commons problem relates to the absence of 
exclusive rights.  Nature‘s bounty is there for anyone whose presence on the commons 
provides temporary control.").  See also id. ("Even for people, all environmental problems, 
indeed all problems of resources use, being with a commons and end with institutions that 
affect environmental use.").     
 40.  See SCOTT, supra note 33, at 22 ("The sovereign independence of a state gives it 
the capacity to enter into relations with other states.‖); but see id. at 29 ("With the growth of 
environmental, human rights, and humanitarian law the principle of noninterference in the 
internal matters of a state is no longer absolute.")  
 41.  See CASSESE, supra note 37, at 153–213 (laying out the various types of 
international legal standards, including the role of custom, the formation of treaties, other 
international law making processes, and the effect of jus cogens on the hierarchy of existing 
rules).   
 42.  See ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS:  A RATIONAL 
CHOICE THEORY 119 (Oxford University Press 2008) (emphasizing that due to state 
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powerful states, which also happen to be the greatest GHG emitters.
43
  
However, this alone does not explain why states are willing to cede 
autonomy in favor of international cooperation and regulation.  Many 
principles of international law are customary in nature, stemming from 
centuries old practices, including the idea that international agreements 
shall be observed.
44
  This is because each nation receives some benefits 
from international cooperation, law, and agreement.
45
  
 However, in order to reap these benefits, states must, to some extent, 
give up their freedom to act as they so choose, thereby binding themselves 
in ways they may not like in the future.
46
  Assuming that states employ 
rational choice, this means that states will only enter into agreements when 
they are better off, or in other words, where the benefits outweigh the 
limitations.
47
  This assumption is one central to the study of international 
relations.  It is premised on the idea that absent an assumption of rational 
choice, there is really nothing to study because any predictive power of the 
discipline is gone.  In this respect, the form, content, and extent of 
international law will depend upon the homogeneity of the political system 
and generally the degree of common interest held by nations worldwide, 
meaning that an agreement will only be reached where every state is better 
off with the agreement than with an alternative arrangement.
48
  
                                                                                                                                
sovereignty, international agreements range dramatically in terms of form, topic, and all 
other conceivable aspects).   
 43.  See BAUMERT ET AL., supra note 30, at Fig. 3.1 (ranking the world‘s largest 
emitters, placing the United States in first and China in second with 20.6% and 14.7% of the 
world‘s emissions respectively). 
 44.  See Louis Henkin, The Politics of Law-Making, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: CLASSIC 
AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS 17 (Charlotte Ku and Paul F. Diehl eds., 1998) ("On 
entering international society, new nations find these obligations (and corresponding rights) 
upon them, and few purport to reject them . . . . [T]here has not been a major challenge to the 
system of international law as a whole, to the bulk of its content, to its major norms.").   
 45.  See id. at 18 (listing benefits of international law to individual states, including 
order, stability, enhanced independence and security, getting other nations to behave in a 
desired manner, avoiding the need to negotiate anew regularly, creating expectations, and 
giving confidence in how other states will behave).   
 46.  See Henkin, supra note 44, at 18 (explaining how each benefit of international 
cooperation comes with a corresponding limitation on state action).   
 47.  See GUZMAN, supra note 42, at 121 (justifying the assumption that rational choice 
be used when looking at whether a state will enter into an agreement and showing that this 
assumption implies that states will seek to maximize their own interests in any international 
cooperation). 
 48.  See Henkin, supra note 44, at 18 ("Nations may have ‗attitudes‘ in regard to the 
desirability of extending the domain of law.  At different times they see greater or less 
interest in self-limitation and cooperation . . . .  Nations differ in regard to how much 
‗freedom‘ they are prepared to sacrifice for some common enterprise or to some 
supranational institution."); see also GUZMAN, supra note 42, at 121 (arguing that where any 
subset of parties to an agreement has a better alternative, they will take it).    
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 Often, as a result of the balance of interests required, states fail to 
reach meaningful agreement and international regulation does not occur.  
This is generally a result of the sovereign nature of states: 
 
An international political system of sovereign states is inherently 
‗laissez-faire,‘ resisting regulation by law.  Surely, norms 
curtailing national autonomy in any important respect are not 
likely to be adopted unless the need for them is commonly seen as 
compelling and the result promises compensating advantage.  
Often, the absence of control by international law is purposeful, 
and many would say desirable . . . Even law commonly seen as 





This general preference favoring less regulation is often simple to surpass 
in circumstances where cooperation is easy.
50
  On the other hand, in 
situations where the parties‘ interests vary and goals conflict, an inability to 
agree is commonplace.
51
   
 Generally, this means that agreement and cooperation are not 
impossible goals.  States can, and have, been able to reach agreement when 
their behavior is restricted by the effects of their actions on reputation, 
reciprocity, and retaliation.
52
  In other words, the result may vary because of 
the need for a good reputation for compliance with international law, the 
                                                        
 49.  Henkin, supra note 44, at 22–23.   
 50.  See GUZMAN, supra note 42, at 25–26 (distinguishing certain situations where state 
can both seek their own self-interest and reach meaningful agreement with other states 
because cooperation in those instances is both easy and valuable to each player).   
 51.  This work chooses to use the tragedy of the commons as a means of understanding 
international cooperation on GHG emissions.  However, a more extensive study might 
employ various game theories, including but not limited to the Prisoner‘s Dilemma.  The 
Prisoner‘s Dilemma is a commonly used game theory in which mutual cooperation of both 
parties would yield the highest payout, but each party has an individual incentive to defect 
regardless of what action the other party takes.  See GUZMAN, supra note 42, at 30–31 
(describing the aspects of the prisoner‘s dilemma as "a game in which the parties can 
maximize their total joint payoff through mutual cooperation but each player does better by 
defecting.").  In a one-shot game, this scenario ensures that both sides will defect and 
cooperation will fail.  Id. at 32.  While the typical prisoner‘s dilemma game involves only 
two players, the basic premise can be extended to collective action problems because even 
these interactions can often be reduced to a two-person game.  See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, 
ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 32 (Harvard 
University Press 1994) (giving the examples of the choice to build or not build a levee in 
which even though the problem is one of collective action, each of the various individuals 
involved can be assigned to one of two positions).  However, this analysis is beyond the 
scope of this article, but remains an area for further exploration.   
 52.  See GUZMAN, supra note 42, at 33–48 (finding that where repeated interactions 
occurred between two states, they were often able to avoid the predicted outcome of the 
prisoner‘s dilemma due to the incentives created by these three characteristics).  
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possibility that a breach will result is a reciprocal breach by the other party, 
and the threat of retaliation from the offended state.
53
  It is for these reasons 
that various international agreements do exist, but where these factors are 
lacking, it is unlikely that meaningful international cooperation will ever 
result.  Therefore, the basis for significant political action is an international 
scientific consensus on the dimensions of the problem and the need for 
cooperative solutions.
54
   
 This understanding of how and why states are able to agree in some 
circumstances but fail to reach consensus in others is particularly important 
with regards to the regulation of GHG emissions.  GHGs create a tragedy of 
the commons problem
55
 where international cooperation is necessary to 
avoid overusing the global commons of the atmosphere and to prevent the 
negative predictions that accompany climate change.
56
      
 
V. The Tragedy of the Commons and the Need for Agreement 
 
 The widespread emission of greenhouse gases generally creates a 
tragedy of the commons problem.
57
  A tragedy of the commons occurs 
when various actors share one common natural resource
58
—in this case the 
atmosphere, or more generally, the environment.
59
  A commons generally 
has three defining characteristics:  (1) it is a domain or collectivity of 
resources, such as the traditional English pasture or commons; (2) the 
resource domain is accessible to various actors, each of which uses it for 
individual benefit; and (3) the resources of the commons are both 
                                                        
 53.  See id. at 33–34 (describing the three Rs of Compliance). 
 54.  See JOHN VOGLER, THE GLOBAL COMMONS: A REGIME ANALYSIS 139 (John Wiley 
& Sons Ltd. 1995) (giving the Montreal Protocol as an example where development was 
possible because political action was grounded in a common scientific understanding).   
 55.  Infra Part V. 
 56.  Infra note 88.  
 57.  While the tragedy of the commons was originally conceptualized at the local level, 
the extreme differences of scale on the international global commons retain similarities to 
the local level.  In fact, equivalent problems and institutional principles can be found at both 
levels.  For this reason, the abundant evidence on the workings of small-scale commons can 
be significant and insightful at the global level as well.  See VOGLER, supra note 54, at 3 
(justifying interchangeable use of the tragedy of the commons and global commons 
analyses).     
 58.  See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 51, at 34 (depicting the original tragedy of the 
commons scenario where shepherds that share a common pasture have an incentive to 
overgraze because no individual shepherd incurs all the costs of adding an additional sheep 
to the flock, but is able to realize all of the benefit).   
 59.  The oldest recognized commons were the oceans.  However, the recognized types 
of commons frequently change as technology develops, the most obvious example being the 
exploration of space.  The atmosphere has become regarded as one of the most essential 
commons for the survival of mankind in the modern age.   See VOGLER, supra note 54, at 7-
9 (specifying the various types of commons and the development of global commons issues 
over time).   
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subtractive and finite, meaning that what is taken by one actor is not 
available to another and the total summation of resources is limited in 
quantity and hence depletable.
60
  Due to the payouts associated with this 
situation,
61
 the common resource will be depleted beyond the optimal point 
for all users.
62
   
 For environmental laws to succeed in averting the tragedy of the 
commons, they must be compatible with the laws of supply and demand 
that occur naturally in the world.
63
   
 
[A] fundamental cause of the environmental problem is  that the 
majority of resources in their natural state, such as water and air, 
are ‗free‘ goods with a price of zero.  That is, they are resources 
that do not belong to any special individual but belong freely to 
the whole community.  As a result no special individual or 
jurisdiction has any incentive to restrict the use or maintain the 
quality of these common resources because he or she does not 
have the right to realize a monetary return for doing so.
64
   
 
This situation is often referred to as the global commons:  the idea that 
certain resources must have global management and be held in common for 
the common use by all.
65
  The global commons are territories and resources 
                                                        
 60.  See MARVIN S. SOROOS, THE ENDANGERED ATMOSPHERE: PRESERVING A GLOBAL 
COMMONS 210 (University of South Carolina Press 1997) (defining the key aspects of a 
commons).   
 61.  Id. at 208–09 (summarizing the theory of the tragedy of the commons where 
individuals add cattle to a common pasture to increase personal profit, even to the point that 
their aggregate herd exceeds the capacity the pasture can sustain, causing the overall value 
of the pasture is decreased due to overcrowding); see also infra note 82 and accompanying 
text (discussing the tragedy of the commons); Christopher C. Joyner, Global Commons:  The 
Oceans, Antarctica, the Atmosphere, and Outer Space, in MANAGING GLOBAL ISSUES:  
LESSONS LEARNED 354, 356–57 (P.J. Simmons & Chantal de Jonge Oudraat eds., 2001) 
(summarizing Hardin‘s traditional commons pasture).     
 62.  See SOROOS, supra note 60, at 208 (quoting Aristotle to show the tendency for 
shared resources to be overused and misused for generations of human society: "‗what is 
common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it.  Everybody thinks 
chiefly of his own, hardly at all of the common interest.‘").   
 63.  See MIGUEL A. SANTOS, J.D., PH.D., LIMITS AND SCOPE OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
47 (Charles Thomas Publisher 1995) ("Environmental laws that ignore natural laws, of 
course, are scientifically irrelevant and bound to fail.  It is counterproductive for an 
environmental decision maker to enact laws that violate the laws of nature.")  
 64.  Id. at 56.   
 65.  See VED P. NANDA, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY 11 
(Transnational Publishers 1995) (defining global commons as "areas ‗beyond the jurisdiction 
and sovereignty of any state, but [which] exist for the common benefit of all‘ and usage of 
which ‗physically affects human beings around the world.‘"); see also VOGLER, supra note 
54, at 2 ("A commons is ‗a resource to which no single decision-making unit holds exclusive 
title.‘").   
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outside the jurisdiction of any one state, such as Antarctica, the atmosphere, 
the oceans, or outer space.
66
  A commons is a "free-access area" where 
individuals have unrestricted access and rights of use—in simplest terms, 




 The solution to the tragedy of the commons is and must be provided 
by the state.
68
  When the problem is contained within a state‘s borders, such 
local issues are within the jurisdiction of the state and that state‘s 
government has the ability to control and regulate to advance the collective 
interest.
69
  Because a global commons does not fall within the jurisdiction 
of any one state, these alternatives are not readily available.
70
  However, 
with technological advances and political pressure on the limited pool of 
common resources, collective regulation becomes theoretically possible, 
although highly improbable and limited.
71
     
 It is common to describe the atmosphere as a global commons even 
though it differs from the high seas or outer space because it has at least 
                                                        
 66.  See NANDA, supra note 65, at 11 (listing various examples of resources historically 
denoted as "commons" including high mountain pastures in Switzerland, village common 
pastures in India, common grazing lands in colonial America and medieval England, Indian 
and Spanish irrigation systems, and so on); see also VOGLER, supra note 54, at 6 ("Global 
commons are areas beyond sovereign state jurisdiction.  This may be because of the physical 
impossibility of extending such control or as a consequence of an international 
agreement . . . .  The limits of the commons and even awareness of their existence has been 
defined by the current state of exploration and technology."); Joyner, supra note 61, at 354 
("Global common spaces are domains lying beyond the exclusive jurisdiction of any state 
that states or their nationals may use for resource extraction, waste disposal, scientific 
research, and so on.").     
 67.  See YANDLE, supra note 39, at 2 (contending that the problem of the commons 
exist as a result of the absence of exclusive rights to scarcely available resources and 
evolutionary biology, which represents the struggle among peoples to access the important 
sources of food, water, and shelter).   
 68.  See VOGLER, supra note 54, at 16 ("When ‗commons‘ problems of pollution or 
land use are essentially local in scope they will be within the jurisdiction of a state . . . and 
there is, therefore, a government which at least has the potential to take control and regulate 
in the collective interest.").   
 69.  See id. (examining possible means of regulation for local problems where states 
can limit user rights, define those rights, and enforce violations, taxes can be imposed on 
damaging activities and  alternatively, a state can employ enclosure, such as the English 
pastoral commons).   
 70.  Id. at 17.   
 71.  See id. (giving an example where such pressures have created international 
agreement—the Law of the Seas—but admitting that such systems are unusual, in large part 
due to the essential difficulties that arise with regards to the use of common pool resources); 
id. at 147 ("It is difficult not to strike an apocalyptic note when discussing climate change, 
and present regime building efforts are meager indeed.")   
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some overlap with territorial sovereignty.
72
  In this sense, it is often referred 
to as the "common concern of mankind," thereby expressing the idea that 
the preservation of the atmosphere is essential to our collective survival.
73
  
Another alternative description is to deem the issue a common sink—the 
use of the atmosphere as a sink for wastes.
74
  Irrespective of the specific 
terminology employed, the atmosphere is accurately conceptualized as a 
global commons because it is a natural resource domain that is essential to 
human life and has been treated as an open-access resource, leaving 
individuals the right to use it at will.
75
   
 However the problem is described, attempts at regulation of GHGs are 
extremely difficult due to the sheer scale and difficulty of the greenhouse 
gas effect when compared to other environmental issues that have seen 
success at the international level in the past.
76
  While the "tragedy" of 
overuse is not necessarily inevitable, the question becomes whether the 
communities utilizing the commons can develop a management scheme that 
restrains use to an acceptable level—a goal which has been most successful 
at relatively small, community levels in which social pressures serve to 
discourage destructive behavior.
77
  Indeed, many theorists have 
pessimistically concluded that by the time global climate change regulation 
is an achievable goal, climate changes will already be irreversible.
78
 
 As discussed above, the tragedy of the commons generally is that 
common users have a tendency to overuse and exploit the resource domain 
                                                        
 72.  See id. at 124 (distinguishing between the high seas which are a common property 
beyond the jurisdiction of any one state and the atmosphere which is at least related to the air 
space above a state and therefore within the state‘s jurisdiction).   
 73.  Id. at 124–25.   
 74.  See Soroos, supra note 60, at 208 ("Humanity has long used the atmosphere as a 
sink for many of its wastes with little awareness and concern for the ways it is being altered 
or degraded.")   
 75.  See id. at 213 (citing E.B. SOLNIKOFF, THE ELUSIVE TRANSFORMATION:  SCIENCE, 
TECHNOLOGY AND THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, 193 (Princeton University 
Press) (1993)) (enumerating several examples of the ways in which humans utilize the 
atmosphere for their survival).   
 76.  See VOGLER, supra note 54, at 147 (differentiating ozone regulation from that of 
GHG emissions on the theory that ozone depletion is more simplistic and easier to analyze 
that GHGs—ozone depletion is easy to see and the causal link is more readily available).   
 77.  See SOROOS, supra note 60, at 209 (limiting the ability of management schemes to 
have meaningful control at the international level).   
 78.  See VOGLER, supra note 54, at 147 ("Judging by the ozone experience, effective 
public pressure on governments will probably only derive from clear and incontrovertible 
evidence that global warming is actually occurring.  The pessimistic conclusion is that . . . by 
that time climate changes may already be irreversible."); see also PATRICIA BIRNIE, ALAN 
BOYLE & CATHERINE REDGWELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE ENVIRONMENT 356 (Oxford 
University Press 2009) ("The range and complexity of issues involved in global warming 
and uncertainty regarding the nature, severity and timescale of possible climate effects make 
the task of phasing out production and consumption of ozone-depleting substances seem 
relatively simple by comparison.")  
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to the point of overcrowding, depletion or destruction, and this "tragedy" is 
already occurring for the atmosphere as the capacity of the global 
atmosphere to absorb and disperse pollutants is continually exceeded due to 
human activities.
79
  This happens even where the users of the commons are 
aware of the harm and impending crisis they are causing.
80
  Because GHG 
emissions have a global rather than just a regional effect, each individual 
country has an incentive to emit more, thereby sharing the cost of such 
emissions on the environment with all other nations but realizing all the 
benefits regionally.  In other words, pollutants attain two benefits from 
releasing GHGs into the air even though they are aware of the negative 
consequences of doing so:  first, they receive the proceeds of the activity 
that generates the GHGs and second, they retain savings from the easy 
disposal of wastes that would otherwise be difficult to dispose of.
81
 
 The only way to avoid this outcome is for all players, in this case 
nations that emit GHGs, to agree on the optimal point of usage at an 
international rather than individual level. Today, the world is populated by 
communities of people that have established rules for managing the 
commons, at least to some extent.
82
  However, the past century has seen 
increased degradation of the environment and the global commons have 
been particularly threatened.
83
  In the last few decades there has been an 
increased awareness among nation states that the global commons presents 
a problem, and yet still reluctance to act remains widespread.
84
  
 In the case of GHG emissions particularly, universal agreement is 
necessary because one large emitter has the capability of creating extensive 
and long-lasting climate change even if all other states were to agree to 
regulation.
85
  An analysis of the global commons problem implies that 
climate change must be dealt with in a top-down manner because there are 
generally two ways in which to avoid the "tragedy" of overuse:  
                                                        
 79.  SOROOS, supra note 60, at 221. 
 80.  See id. at 221 ("Such behavior is the outgrowth of a rational assessment of self-
interested actors who calculate that all the proceeds from using the commons will go 
exclusively to themselves as individual actors, while the environmental costs associated with 
overgrazing will be shared with the entire community."). 
 81.  See id. at 221–22 (finding that the share of the polluter‘s costs are much lower than 
the value of the benefits he or she receives from the polluting activity).   
 82.  See YANDLE, supra note 39, at 3–4, 6 (theorizing that the commons problem has 
traditionally been solved in two ways:  the process or systems approach—process refers to 
the rules people set out for each other and follow often as a matter of custom; the systems 
approach is more centralized and requires leaders to create and enforce rules).   
 83.  See NANDA, supra note 65, at 25 (stating that the past century has seen massive 
pollution of air and water, destruction of the world‘s rainforests, stratospheric ozone 
depletion, and so on).   
 84.  See id. at 25–26 (explaining this reluctance in large part as a result of sovereignty 
and arguing that any meaningful environmental standards for the use of the global commons 
must outrank sovereignty concerns for change to be effective).   
 85.  IPCC, supra note 14, at 46–47. 
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"privatization or the imposition of resource protection by an external 
sovereign."
86
  To date, various strategies have been employed at the 
international level to limit GHG emissions with varying degrees of success.     
 Generally, "[t]he effective management of the global commons is 
brought about by state compliance with internationally agreed-upon 
norms."
87
  These norms have traditionally come in two forms:  treaties and 
custom.
88
  Custom is generally characterized as a general practice and the 
"conviction that such practice reflects, or amounts to, law . . . or is required 
by social, economic, or political exigencies . . . ."
89
  Treaties on the other 
hand, are usually written and represent the consent of two or more nations 
to be bound by certain international rules.
90
  While each has an equal rank 
and status, and the extent to which either creates a long-lasting, binding, 
meaningful agreement is often questionable.
91
  The formation of 
instruments for managing the global commons, including the regulation of 
GHG emissions, has been significant, but the promulgation and 
implementation of these agreements has been drastically lacking.
92
  In order 
for any method to be successful, implementation, government compliance, 




 What this analysis means for the international regulation of GHG 
emissions is twofold.  First, to date, attempts at meaningful regulation have 
failed to prevent the tragedy of the commons that results from the 
widespread emission of GHGs.
94
  Second, due to the sovereign nature of 
states, the ways in which states create agreements, and the inability of the 
international community to reach an accord on climate change regulation, 
                                                        
 86.  See Katherine Trisolini & Jonathan Zasloff, Cities, Land Use, and the Global 
Commons: Genesis and the Urban Politics of Climate Change, in ADJUDICATING CLIMATE 
CHANGE 72, 72–74 (William C.G. Burns & Hari M. Osofsky eds., 2009) (introducing the 
fundamental implications of the global commons issue for climate change regulation).   
 87.  Joyner, supra note 61, at 365.  
 88.  See CASSESE, supra note 37, at 153 (maintaining that states are generally bound by 
either treaties or custom; treaties binding only those parties that sign on and custom binding 
parties that do not object at the outset, thereby meaning that each type rests on consent).   
 89.  Id. at 156.   
 90.  See id. at 170 (including treaties, conventions, protocols, covenants, and acts as 
types of agreements falling within this category, but specifying that such agreements only 
serve to bind the signatories and hence have limited appeal where all nations fail to sign on).   
 91.  See id. at 154 (arguing that States can elect to derivate from customary norms and 
new norms could outrank treaties, thereby enabling parties to dispose of prior obligations by 
mutual assent whenever their interests have changed).   
 92.  See Joyner, supra note 61, at 365 ("The negotiation of instruments for managing 
global commons areas has been notable and significant.  Still, promulgation and even entry 
into force of such agreements is not sufficient.").   
 93.  See id. ("Implementation, government compliance, and reactions to 
noncompliance are critical if the global commons are to be successfully managed and 
conserved.").  
 94.  Id. 
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the future for international cooperation and consensus looks bleak.
95
  
Whatever the world is doing is not working, and absent some change in 
circumstances, it seems unlikely that a different result will magically occur 
unless the methodology with which the problem is approached is 
reformulated.  The question then becomes how can the interactions of states 
be altered or influenced in order to advance the goals of climate change 
regulation.       
 
VI. The Need for the Adoption of a Theoretical Lens 
 
 Attempting to shape the interactions and agreements of sovereign 
states, with an eye towards encouraging the development of climate change 
regulation, requires a predictive mechanism of some kind.  Therefore, to 
anticipate the actions of states and the ways in which states will be affected, 
one must first have an understanding of the basic nature of nations—a 
concept that has been hotly debated and contested throughout history. 
Indeed, the underlying characteristics and tendencies of states within the 
international realm has been the center of scholarly research and debate 
known as international relations theory. 
 International relations and international law academia have identified 
and disseminated various understandings with regards to the basic nature 
and tendencies of states.  This has been done with the objective of 
understanding why states act as they do within the confines of the 
international system, with the underlying assumption being that there must 
be some underlying theory or philosophy through which the relationships of 
states can be viewed, dissected, and understood.
96
  Traditionally, legal 
scholars have identified three such lenses:  realism, liberalism, and 
constructivism.
97
  This means that in order to change the interaction of 
states with regards to climate change regulation, one must first adopt a lens 
through which to examine state action.  Of these, this note adopts the 
constructivist lens for the reasons discussed below.
98
  Only then can a 
prediction be made regarding what types of motivations, if any, will affect 





                                                        
 95.  Id.  
 96.  SCOTT, supra note 33, at 88.   
 97.  See DAVID ARMSTRONG, THEO FARRELL & HELENE LAMBERT, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 69–71 (Cambridge University Press 2007) (providing 
an introduction to the three lenses of analyzing international relationships and international 
law:  realism, liberalism, and constructivism). 
 98.  Infra Part VII. 
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VII. The Rejection of Liberalism and Realism 
  
 This section is meant to explain the general preference for a 
constructivist lens, whose independent justification is laid out more 
thoroughly in Part VIII.  While the time and space limits of this note do not 
allow for it, ideally one would address the implications for state action 
under each of the three lenses.  In this sense, this section is not meant to 
rule out liberalism and realism as potentially helpful and insightful lenses, 
but instead should be read as an explanation for the choice of one lens over 
the use of two others where such a choice was necessary.   
 Constructivism is the newest of the three lenses
99
—realism and 
idealism having longer roots in international relations scholarship.  
Realism, as presented by Hobbes, Machiavelli, and Thucydides, presents 
states as the only significant actors in world politics and argues that they are 
rational actors within a competitive and anarchic international system 
where each state will seek out its own best interests.
100
  Liberalism, 
proposed in turn by Locke, Kant, and John Stuart Mill, focuses on norms, 
regimes, and institutions, arguing that harmony, not war, was the natural 
state of the international community.
101
 
 Both liberalism and realism have been rejected for the purposes of this 
note:  namely examining the possibility of international cooperation 
regarding global climate change regulation.  Liberalism has been generally 
discredited following the occurrence of the two world wars of 1914–1918 
and 1939–1945.
102
  Following the Cold War, liberalism returned to favor, 
particularly through the work of Fukuyama who argued that liberal 
democracy was the "‗final form of human government.‘"
103
  However, 
within the last few decades, even Fukuyama has recognized the rise of 
Islamic militancy as counter to his argument,
104
 and liberalist theories have 
                                                        
 99.  ARMSTRONG ET AL., supra note 97, at 69–70.  
 100.  See id. at 72–74 (prioritizing the role of states and the material factors of 
international existence such as military resources, the balance of power and so on over the 
non-material factors such as social norms, institutions, and international law).  
 101.  See id. at 69; see also id. at 83–87 (refuting realism by arguing that state are not 
rational actors, but instead are vehicles for the views of individuals and purporting that states 
can form interdependent ties); SCOTT BURCHILL, RICHARD DEVETAK, ANDREW LINKLATER, 
MATTHEW PATERSON, CHRISTIAN REUS-SMIT, & JACQUI TRUE, THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS 55 (Palgrave Macmillan 2005) (1995) (describing liberalism as championing 
democratic government, science, political freedom, and constitutionally guaranteed rights).     
 102.  See ARMSTRONG ET AL., supra note 97, at 84–85 (giving examples refuting the 
theory of liberalism, including the democratic election of Adolf Hitler and the failure of 
democracy to bring a lasting peace).   
 103.  See BURCHILL ET AL., supra note 101, at 56 (citing the theories of Fukuyama and 
his belief that liberalism had proved itself the dominant international relations theory).   
 104.  See id. at 57 ("The path of Western modernity in 2005 does not look as straight or 
inevitable as it did a decade ago.").   
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been largely disfavored with scholars turning instead to a constructivist 
understanding of international relations.  
 Realism has likewise been rejected, because it provides little, if any, 
hope for international cooperation with regards to climate change 
regulation.  Realism is criticized on various grounds, most notably on its 
failure to recognize the importance of non-state actors such as multinational 
corporations, banks, terrorists, international organizations, and so on.
105
  
However, even if realism is the correct lens through which to view the 
international world, the realist view of the international system, the role of 
the state, and the balance of power politics, leaves almost no possibility for 
any fundamental transformation of international politics absent violence.
106
  
Therefore, any further analysis using this lens is less persuasive as it 
implies that meaningful climate change regulation will never result from 
mere discussion and compromise.  For these reasons, the constructivist lens 
is the intuitive choice and has been adopted initially on this rationale and 
ultimately for the reasons discussed below.
107
   
 
VIII. Constructivism Justified 
 
 Constructivism, as discussed above,
108
 is the most applicable lens, for 
the purposes and limitations of this work, available of the three leading 
international relations theories.  Constructivism stresses both normative and 
ideational structures on the theory that both shape the social identities of 
political actors.
109
  ―For constructivists, the material world of states and 
rational action (the world of realists) only makes sense when located in the 
social world that gives meaning to states as actors and defines what is 
rational in given circumstances.‖
110
 
 Ultimately, what this means is that transnational actors and states have 
interests and preferences that are not fully formed or unchanging, but 




State interests are defined in the context of internationally held 
norms and understandings about what is good and appropriate.  
                                                        
 105.  PAUL R. VIOTTI & MARK V. KAUPPI, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY: 
REALISM, PLURALISM, GLOBALISM, AND BEYOND 84 (Allyn & Bacon 1999) (1987).   
 106.  See id. at 86 (explaining that realist stability is a world where weapons are a 
necessity and changes are achieved through the use of violence and war—meaningful and 
peaceful change is all but impossible).   
 107.  Infra Part VIII.   
 108.  Supra Part VII. 
 109.  BURCHILL ET AL., supra note 101, at 196.   
 110.  ARMSTRONG ET AL., supra note 97, at 70 (emphasis in original).   
 111.  See OONA A. HATHAWAY & HAROLD HONGJU KOH, FOUNDATIONS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 112 (Foundation Press 2005) (framing the various 
discussions of constructivism).   
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That normative context influences the behavior of decisionmakers 
and of mass publics who may choose and constrain those 
decisionmakers.  The normative context also changes over time, 
and as internationally held norms and values change, they create 





Basically, constructivists believe, like realists, that state actors make 
rational decisions, but unlike realists, constructivists believe that these 
decisions are based on social construction.
113
  In this way, constructivism is 
about the role of human consciousness in the international realm and 




 Generally, the use of a constructivist lens is justifiable for a variety of 
reasons.  First, as discussed above, it is intuitively the most optimistic 
match of the three primary international relations lenses.
115
  Second, 
constructivism as a theory is well suited for the analysis of climate change.  
Third, political relations theory, including constructivist thought, works 
well with legal scholars and provides a theoretical basis upon which to 
build legal action.  Fourth, this lens is able to distinguish between climate 
change regulation and the much more successful ozone agreements that 
have developed.  And, finally, constructivism is able to explain why cities 
have adopted protective policies where other theories have failed to find an 
explanation.  
 If climate change regulation is necessary and normatively good, 
constructivism is an appropriate lens to adopt because it implies change is 
possible.
116
  Just because a particular lens would tend to lead to the 
conclusion that climate change regulation is a hopeless endeavor does not 
mean that it is worthless—indeed an understanding of any such approach is 
crucial when trying to determine whether climate change regulation is 
                                                        
 112.  Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, in FOUNDATIONS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 112, 113–14 (Oona A. Hathaway & Harold Hongju Koh 
eds., 2005).  
 113. See VIOTTI & KAUPPI, supra note 105, at 217 ("Norms are constitutive, meaning 
such concepts as ‗sovereignty‘ and ‗equality‘ are social constructions that help shape the 
identities and interests of international actors.  Hence, social constructivists argue that the 
realist assumption of egoistic identities and treating state interests as givens is questionable; 
these factors… instead [are] dependent variables . . . .") 
 114.  John Gerard Ruggie, What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism 
and the Social Constructivist Challenge, in FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
POLITICS 120, 125–26 (Oona A. Hathaway & Harold Hongju Koh eds., 2005).  
 115. Supra Part VII.   
 116. See HATHAWAY & KOH, supra note 111, at 112 (arguing that transnational actors 
and their interests are not fully formed, but rather, are capable of being changed or 
"constructed" through interaction).   
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possible at all.  However, for the purposes of this work, the goal is to 
determine whether even our best chance of meaningful climate change 
regulation leads one to conclude that such regulation is possible.  In this 
way, the constructivist lens will provide an understanding of the world‘s 
best options it attempting to encourage international agreement.   
 The basic characteristics of constructivism as a theory are generally 
compatible with the analysis of climate change regulation.  A lens that 
incorporates a sense of norms is particularly important with regards to 
international cooperation analysis because at the international level, norms 
are essentially the source of law.
117
  Therefore, any attempt to show how 
actors‘ identities and interests, i.e. norms, are socially constructed is 
particularly pertinent at the international level.
118
     
 Constructivism, as an international relations theory, is well suited as a 
lens because of its general compatibility with legal scholarship.  The law 
and political science scholarship have a close relationship because one of 
the functions of legal scholarship is to identify norms and rules at the 
international level—a process that relies heavily on the work of political 
scientists.
119
  "A constructivist approach in political science opens up 
possibilities for conversation with international legal scholars that were 
foreclosed under realist domination of [the] discipline."
120
  In this sense, an 
international analysis of climate change regulation is connected to 
constructivism in two primary ways.  First, the nature of international legal 
scholarship and constructivism are analytically similar in the sense that 
each are looking for evidence that states share a common understanding 
that certain principles are law by looking at state behavior, discourse, and 
action.
121
  Second, both are interested in articulating and codifying norms 
and laws that apply to states at the international level.
122
  For these reasons, 
a political theory lens is applicable despite the fact that our analysis is one 
of legal scholarship.   
 Perhaps most importantly, the adoption of a constructivist lens is 
justified by its ability to explain the failures and successes of climate 
                                                        
 117. See Finnemore, supra note 112, at 118 ("The notion that norms, understandings, 
and discourse shape state behavior is hardly news to many outside political science.  
International legal scholars have always known this: norms are their bread and butter.  At the 
international level norms are the law.") 
 118. See Ruggie, supra note 114, at 126 (describing how the basic tenets of 
constructivism are well matched with the study of international relations, particularly by 
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 119. See Finnemore, supra note 112, at 119 (relating international legal scholarship to 
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 120. Id. at 118.   
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of establishing the existence of a norm).   
 122. Id. at 118–19.   
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change regulation.  This explanatory power lends legitimacy to the 
constructivist lens and implies that an analysis from this viewpoint will 
have the most predictive power.   
 International systems have universally been unable to develop 
environment agreement and regulation with one exception:  international 
efforts to protect the stratospheric ozone layer.
123
  Part of this distinction 
comes from the fact that when compared to climate change, ozone depletion 
is a relatively simple problem, where scientific understanding and 
replacement technologies abound.
124
  However, at least two legal scholars 
believe that the success of ozone regulation is due to a combination of 
various factors, including the impact of public pressure and the leadership 
role played by the United States and other international institutions.
125
  This 
legitimizes the constructivist claim that norms can be shaped, particularly 
when outside parties exert pressure on a state, thereby influencing state 
action.   
 Finally, the constructivist lens is validated by its ability to explain the 
protective policies adopted by various U.S. cities, even where the tragedy of 
the commons theory would predict that such initiative would fail to occur 
because it is against the interests of the cities.
126
  An analysis of the 
commons problem
127
 would usually suggest that local governments will fail 
to address climate change, particularly where a federal mandate is lacking 
as is the case in the U.S.
128
  However, when viewed through a constructivist 
lens, this discrepancy is explained. 
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 As described, constructivism posits that national interests can be 
altered by interactions with other states and actors.
129
  In this sense, city 
actions should be influenced by other actors within the greater system.   
 
Thus, the politics of local climate change may be driven by 
powerful advocacy networks whose origins lie far from the cities 
in which they operate.  Within this framework, national and 
international environmental organizations raise the issue‘s 
salience, propose specific actions, and command press attention, 





This analysis provides perhaps the best explanatory analysis of city action, 
particularly with regards to the predictions of the tragedy of the commons.  
For this reason and those listed above, a constructivist lens has been 
adopted in order to examine how the interactions of states be altered or 
influenced in order to advance the goals of climate change regulation. 
 
IX. A Constructivist Understanding:  Where We Go from Here 
 
 In light of the preceding discussion, the interaction of state sovereignty 
and the global commons problem of GHG emissions must be understood by 
using a constructivist lens.  In regards to climate change regulation, the lack 
of any meaningful international governance system leaves state consent as 
the only viable option for cooperation, and from our discussion, this method 
clearly has severe limitations.
131
  However, a constructivist understanding 
shows that the interests of a state flow from that state‘s conceptions of its 
own identity.
132
  Therefore, one must conclude that meaningful climate 
change regulation will only occur if states care about climate change at 
more than just its face value—they must identify cooperation, regulation, 
and the decrease of GHG emissions as an aspect of their own culture, 
society, and self-identity in order for international agreement to abound.   
 For whatever reason, all states do not currently see climate change 
regulation as an interest that they must pursue, as exemplified by the lack of 
significant action at an international level on climate change.
133
  
Constructivism argues that this preference is not rigid or unchanging, but 
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instead can be molded and shaped for the future.
134
  The question then 
becomes how this change can be encouraged, thereby giving the world a 
chance at reaching meaningful agreement before it is too late.   
 There are three alternatives that intuitively leap to the forefront as 
means of change for state interests, preferences, and understandings of 
international norms.  The first of these is to hope that change occurs 
naturally, in its own time.  This type of change, as constructivism teaches, 
is possible, particularly as a result of state interactions with one another.  
However, this process is slow moving and there is no guarantee that states 
will head in a direction towards preferences that favor climate change 
regulation. 
 The second possible means of change at the international level is to 
wait until some crisis event creates a realignment of state interests.  In our 
case, this crisis would be severe climate change affecting the daily lives of 
humans across the planet due to the continually increased GHG emissions 
and lack of meaningful agreement.  While such a crisis would undoubtedly 
create state preferences in favor of regulation, it would be too little, too late.  
As already discussed, GHGs have a "feedback loop" where at some point 
the nature of the gases dictate that negative effects continue to abound for a 
certain amount of time, regardless of measures taken to reduce current 
emissions.
135
  This means that waiting for a crisis event to change state 
preferences will fail to prevent the negative consequences predicted as a 
result of GHG emissions.   
 The third and final alternative is for one or more nations to step 
forward as a leader on climate change regulation in the hopes of shaping the 
preferences and actions of other states through interactions within the 
international realm.  Constructivism points to such a conclusion and 
suggests that this ability to influence the actions of other states has the 
potential to create a top-down regulatory regime to deal with the global 
commons problem.   
 Of the world‘s nations, the United States is particularly poised to step 
forward as such a leader.
 
  If we as a nation are serious about protecting 
against the dangers of climate change through international regulation, we 
must begin to regulate GHG emissions within our own borders and call on 
other nations to do the same.  We must lead by example and hope that in 
doing so, we are able to influence the behavior of other GHG emitting 
states.   
 While this last option is the best alternative available, it too has severe 
limitations.  First, the process will be slow moving and faced with 
resistance—particularly from developing countries and probably from 
countries like China and India that are still rapidly expanding.  Secondly, 
                                                        
 134.  Supra Part VIII.   
 135.  See IPCC, supra note 14, at 46-47 (describing the feedback loop in detail). 
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the attempts by the U.S. in the past aimed at affecting international identity 
and state preferences have seen little success.
136
  There is certainly 
significant doubt as to whether even this approach will be successful before 




 The prospect of meaningful climate change regulation in time to 
address the negative effects of GHG emissions is dismal at best.  Of the 
alternatives suggested by the above analysis only one seems truly plausible, 
and even it implies a high likelihood of failure.  The global commons 
problem is one that requires a top-down approach when it comes to GHG 
emissions, and the world is not in a place where such an agreement can be 
reached.  If a change in state preferences is something the world wants to 
work towards, the best attempt at meaningful change is for one nation to 
step forward as a climate change leader.     
 Of course this leaves open the question of whether any nation should 
agree to take this action.  In particular, the U.S. must look long and hard to 
determine whether the costs of such a risky endeavor are something that it 
should embrace.  However, this cost-benefit analysis is a question for 
another day.  According to this analysis, one can be sure that the global 
commons and national sovereignty make the regulation of GHG emissions 
particularly difficult.  Top-down regulation is possible, using a 
constructivist lens, but even with this understanding there are clear 
limitations on the ability of change to occur within the necessary time 
frame.  The outlook for meaningful climate change regulation is dim, and 
absent the strong leadership of one or more countries actively pushing 
states to adopt such policies is undoubtedly hopeless.     
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